Abstract. In response to the current need for fast, secure and cheap public-key cryptography, we study an interactive zero-knowledge identication scheme and a derived signature scheme that combine provable security based on the general problem of computing discrete logarithms modulo any number, short identity-based keys, very short transmission and minimal on-line computation. This leads to both e cient and secure applications well suited to the implementation on low cost smart cards. We develop complete proofs of completeness, soundness and statistical zero-knowledge property of the identi cation scheme. The security analysis of the signature scheme leads to present a novel number theoretical lemma of independent interest and an original use of the \forking lemma" technique. From a practical point of view, the possible choice of parameters is discussed and we submit performances of an actual implementation on a cheap smart card. As an example, a complete and secure authentication can be performed in less than 20 ms with low cost equipment.
Introduction
Besides con dentiality, cryptographers face two important problems: authentication and signature or, in plain words, how to prove one's identity and how to digitally sign a document. Recently, several proposals have already addressed those two questions, putting forward elegant solutions, many of them based on the concept of zero-knowledge introduced in 1985 by Goldwasser, Micali and Racko 10] . In order to assess the performances of those schemes, four properties have to be considered: { The most important concern is, of course, security. Basically, a system is supported by the claim that nobody has been able to jeopardize it so far. This is of course important but, in many applications, it is not a satisfactory guarantee. A much better paradigm tries to prove security in a mathematical sense, i.e. to establish theorems claiming that illegal actions such as impersonation are as di cult as solving a speci c problem whose di culty is well-established. Among these problems are integer factorization 3] or the computation of discrete logarithms in a nite group 21] . Half way between heuristic validation and formal proofs are proofs in a model where concrete objects are replaced by some ideal counterparts: applying this paradigm to hash functions yields the random oracle model described by Bellare and Rogaway in 1] . Although this approach may not be considered as o ering absolute proofs of security for speci c schemes, it provides a strong guarantee about their general design.
{ Next, the size of the data involved in the scheme is of crucial practical signi cance. We usually need short public and private keys, we want to reduce the amount of transmissions and, lastly, the length of the generated signatures is an important parameter in many applications.
{ Another key property is the time complexity of the scheme which controls the cost of the devices on which it may be implemented. There, we have to distinguish between the time needed for the precomputations that can be performed o -line possibly by a trusted authority (use & throw coupons 15] ) and the calculations that have to be done on-line during authentication or signature. The latter is often the bottleneck of many applications, especially when smart cards are used.
{ Finally, in situations where a directory is not available, public keys need to be certi ed. A few paradigms are known; the simplest consists in having some authority sign the key in order to produce a certi cate. This often degrades drastically the performances of a scheme, especially in terms of size. A simpler and more e cient technique has been proposed by Shamir 18] and just consists in using public keys so closely related to the identity that they do not have to be further certi ed. In this paper, we study an interactive zero-knowledge identi cation scheme and a derived signature scheme that combine provable security based on the general discrete logarithm problem (which di culty is equivalent to the one of factoring integers and computing discrete logarithms modulo prime numbers), identity based short keys, very short transmissions and signature size and minimal on-line computation. This provides a solution for applications which require e cient and secure identi cation or signature generation while using only low cost individual devices. A typical example is \on the y" authentication at a toll where the time needed to transmit data and to perform on-line calculations is very short, about 0:1 seconds.
Related Work
In 1989, C. Schnorr 17] proposed an identi cation and a signature scheme based on the problem of computing discrete logarithms in groups of prime order. In these schemes the size of the data is short and the computations load is quite acceptable. Moreover, they are provably secure in the random oracle model 17, 16, 20] . Towards a more precise description, let p be a prime number, q a large prime divisor of p ? 1 and g an element of Z p of order q. The user receives a secret key s in Z q and the corresponding public key v = g ?s mod p. If he wants to be identi ed, he generates x 2 Z q at random and sends the commitment t = g x mod p to the veri er who answers a challenge c randomly chosen in 0; k . Then the prover computes y = x + sc mod q and sends y to the veri er who check the equation t = g y v c mod p.
Modi cations of the Schnorr scheme that achieve additional properties have already been proposed 2, 6] . Basically, they use a composite number in place of p to provide identity-based public keys. A way to improve the protocol e ciency is to get rid of modular reductions during identi cation or signature. Exponentiation modulo p can be performed o -line by the user's device or precomputed by an authority in a use & throw coupons 15] setting. Therefore, in order to further reduce the on-line computation to a very simple operation, it is tempting to eliminate the second modulus q by performing operations in Z. This has been proposed by Girault in 7] as an example of protocol allowing \self-certi ed" public keys.
Our Results
In this paper we show that, using the above scheme, it is possible to achieve a combination of the strongest properties that one can demand. In section 2 we study the identi cation scheme and we prove that it is secure against active adversaries for any modulus n, provided the computation of discrete logarithms modulo n is hard. Next, we prove that, with suitable parameters, the protocol is statistically zero-knowledge. In section 3, we introduce a derived signature scheme and we use the random oracle model in order to validate the proposed design, showing that if an adversary is able to forge a signature under an adaptively chosen message attack then he is able to compute discrete logarithms modulo n. Finally, section 4 is more practical on character: we discuss how to choose secure parameters in order to resist to the most e cient known attacks against factorization and discrete logarithm (4.1); we show that the schemes support identity based public keys (4.2) and explain how to optimize the data size (4.3), and nally we give the performances of two smart cards applications.
It should be clear that we have not invented a new scheme. Rather, we have given a thorough theoretical and practical treatment of a scheme that had not received strong attention from the crypto community, presumably because it lacked this type of analysis and, accordingly, might have been considered as dangerous despite its potential advantages. This is consistent with a current trend of today's cryptography and other examples appear in the recent literature 19]. fA(x; y)g ", and = a 2 X= Pr y fA(a; y)g "=2 then Pr x fx 2 g "=2.
We now describe the parameters of the system. Let n, S, X and k be four integers and g be an element of Z n of order (n). The relations between those parameters are analyzed in the next section. We let := (k ? 1)(S ? 1).
The private keys s are chosen in 0; S and the public keys v are computed by the relation v = g ?s mod n. A round of identi cation consists for the prover in randomly choosing an integer x in 0; X and computing the commitment t = g x mod n. Then he sends t to the prover who answers a challenge c randomly chosen in 0; k . The prover computes y = x + sc and sends it to the veri er who checks t = g y v c mod n. A complete identi cation consists in repeating`times the elementary round.
Security Analysis
In order to prove the security of this protocol against active adversaries, we follow the approach of Feige, Fiat and Shamir 4], proving completeness, soundness and the zero-knowledge property. Later on we consider that the security parameter is jnj and that S, X and`are functions of jnj. For technical reasons related to the proof of the zero-knowledge property, k is considered as a constant. In order to simplify the notations, we do not write the dependences on jnj but when we say that an expression f is negligible, this means that f depends on jnj and that, for any constant c and for large enough jnj, f(jnj) < 1=jnj c . Theorem 2 (Completeness). The execution of the protocol between a prover who knows the secret key corresponding to his public key and a veri er is always successful.
Proof. Just notice that g y v c = g x+sc g ?sc = g x = t mod n. u t
The proof of soundness consists in proving that, if someone is correctly identied then, with overwhelming probability, he must know the secret key associated with his public key. We need two lemmas.
Lemma 3. Let n be any integer and L be any multiple of (n). Then there exists a Pptm(jnj) which, on input (n; L), output the factorization of n in time O(jnjjLj).
Proof. This lemma is due to Miller and is proved in 14]. u t Lemma 4. Assume that some Pptm(jnj) adversary e P is accepted by honest veri ers with probability 1=k`+ ", " > 0. Then there exists a probabilistic Turing machine which outputs the private key s from the public data with overwhelming probability in time O(jnjk` =" + jnj O (1) ), where is the average running time of a round of identi cation.
Proof. Assume that some Pptm(jnj) adversary e P(!), running on random tape !, is accepted with probability 1=k`+". We write ACC( e P ACC( e P (!); c 1 ; :::c`)g 1=k`+ "=2. Using lemma 1, we obtain that Pr ! f! 2 g "=2.
We now explain how to use e P in order to obtain a machine which on input (n; g; v) answers ( ; ) such that v = g mod n, with ?k < < k, in time O(jnjk` =") where is the average running time of a round of identi cation.
We rst choose a random tape !. Then, let i vary from 1 to`. For each i, we let e P(!) produce the i th commitment t i and note S i the state reached by e P(!).
We ask e P(!) the k possible challenges and, each time, we check the answer and
we reset e P(!) at state S i . After those k steps, three cases may appear:
-if e P(!) has correctly answered two challenges c and c 0 , with y and y 0 , return ( = c 0 ? c; = y ? y 0 ).
-if e P(!) cannot answer any challenge, return Fail.
-if e P(!) answers exactly one challenge, keep on with the loop. If the end of the loop is reached, return Fail.
With probability "=2, ! 2 and therefore this machine returns ( ; ) such that v = g mod n after at most O(k` ) time units. If we repeat 2jnj=" times this procedure with other random tapes, ( ; ) is obtained with overwhelming probability in time O(jnjk` ="). We rst use the machine with the input (n; g; v 0 ), where v 0 = g mod n for chosen much greater than n. It returns ( ; ) such that v 0 = g mod n so L = ? is a multiple of (n) and L 6 = 0 with high probability because even if the machine is able to compute discrete logarithms modulo n in base g, it only learns the value of modulo (n). Using the result of lemma 3, n is factored and accordingly (n) is computed in polynomial time.
We then use the machine again with the public key v whose discrete logarithm is unknown; it answers (c; y) such that v c = g y mod n and, solving the equation y + sc = 0 mod (n), we obtain s 0 = s mod 0 with 0 = (n)= gcd(c; (n)).
Since k is assumed to be a constant and ?k < c < k, we can test whether v = g ?s0?i 0 for all the positive integers i less than gcd(c; (n)) < k and obtain the secret s. u t Theorem 5 (Soundness). Assume that some Pptm(jnj) adversary e P is accepted with non-negligible probability by honest veri ers and that log(jnj) = o (`) and that`is polynomial in jnj. Then there exists a Pptm(jnj) which outputs s from public data with overwhelming probability.
Proof. If (jnj) is the non-negligible probability of success of e P, there exists an integer d such that (jnj) 1=jnj d for in nitely many values jnj. Furthermore, for jnj large enough, 1=k`< 1=2jnj d because log(jnj) = o(`). So, taking " = (jnj)=2 in lemma 4 we conclude that it is possible to compute s in time O(jnjk` =" + jnj O (1) ). If we assume that`is polynomial in jnj, then there exists a Pptm(jnj) which outputs s from public data with overwhelming probability. Let us denote by p i (t; c; y) the probability to obtain the triplet (t; c; y) in the actual round and by p i 0 (t; c; y) the probability to obtain the same triplet during the simulation. Using the strategy c i (Data i ; t) = Q(t) of e V to choose the challenges, we rst calculate p: We can also calculate the conditional probability p 0 , using the Bayes' law: p 0 ( ; ; This is rigorously proved in appendix A. Therefore the protocol is statistically zero-knowledge as soon as ST=X is negligible.
u t 3 Signature Scheme
We can turn the identi cation scheme into a signature scheme in a way initially proposed by Fiat and Shamir 5] and used by Schnorr 17] and others. In order to perform the transformation, the challenges c are no longer randomly chosen by a veri er but computed through a hash function h. The signature of a message m is computed by taking a random x in 0; X and computing t = g x mod n, c = h(m; t) and y = x + sc. This produces the signature (t; c; y) that may be checked by anybody with the equations c = h(m; t) and t = g y v c mod n. We now note 0; k the output range of h. Note that, in the identi cation scheme, k was a xed constant but, in the signature setting, we need to let k depend on the security parameter jnj, like S, X and T.
Security Analysis
In order to prove the security of this protocol, we show that, if someone is able to forge valid signatures after having obtained signatures of messages he chose, then we can use him to compute the secret s. The random oracle model 1] is used to model the behavior of the hash function h so the proofs validate the overall design. We rst need a lemma, proving that a Pptm(jnj) can statistically simulate actual signature generation. We also use a number theoretical result which is of independent interest and which allows a precise estimate of the greatest common divisor of two random numbers.
Lemma 7. The outputs of the signature algorithm can be statistically simulated by a Pptm(jnj) if kS=X is negligible. u t An attacker who existentially forges the signature scheme can be modeled as a Pptm(jnj) A(!), running on random tape !, which is able, for in nitly many values of the security parameter jnj and for a non-negligible fraction of the public keys, to nd with probability "(jnj) a message m and a valid signature (t; c; y).
Two scenario of attacks are considered, the no-message attack during which A(!) can ask Q queries Q 1 :::Q Q to a random oracle f and the adaptively chosen message attack where A(!) can also ask the signatures (t i ; c i ; y i ) of R messages m 1 :::m R he chooses to a signature oracle. This oracle knows the private key associated with the public one, follows the signature algorithm and consequently uses f to compute the challenges. We note T the maximal number of messages signed with a xed key and A the average running time of an attacker A. Theorem 9. If an existential forgery of the signature scheme under a no-message attack has a probability of success " 8Q=k then the discrete logarithm can be computed with probability " 4 =(2 10 Q 5 ) within time 3 A + O(Q 2 =" 2 ).
Proof. The proof is based on a technique developed by Pointcheval and Stern 16] and known as the forking lemma. It consists in making the attacker run with di erent random oracles in order to obtain valid signatures (t; c i ; y i ) of a message m with the same commitment t and consequently equations of the form g yi v ci = g yj v cj mod n. Then, like in the proof of soundness of the identi cation scheme, this leads to the computation of the discrete logarithm of the public key.
We describe a Pptm(jnj) M which obtains the valid signatures. It is far from being the most e cient one but it is the easiest to analyse. M rst chooses an index for which we assume that the question Q asked by the attacker to the random oracle will be (m; t). Then it chooses a random tape ! and three random oracles which answer identiquely the ?1 rst queries. Finally M makes the attacker A(!) running with each oracle and we hope to obtain three valid signatures (t; c; y), (t; c 0 ; y 0 ) and (t; c 00 ; y 00 ) of the same message m. The following analysis proves that M succeeds with probability " 4 =(2 10 Q 5 ) and further that 0 < gcd(c ? c 0 ; c ? c 00 ) 173 Q 2 =" 2 .
Then, in order to compute a discrete logarithm modulo n, we rst use M with a public key v 0 which discrete logarithm is known and this leads to the value of (n), just like in the proof of soundness of the identi cation scheme. Then we use it again with the public key v which discrete logarithm (?s) is searched and we obtain s 0 = s mod (n)= gcd(c ? c 0 ; c ? c 00 ; (n)). This explains why we need three valid signatures instead of two in the original forking lemma: in the identi cation scheme, k was xed so gcd(c ? c 0 ; (n)) < k was always \small"; here, k depends on jnj and is \very large" so we need a second \forking" to be sure, thanks to the result of the lemma 8, to obtain a \small" gcd whatever (n) may be and therefore to be able to nd s mod (n) after an exhaustive search.
We now analyse why M succeeds in nding valid signatures. First, we can assume that A(!) does not ask the random oracle twice the same query so the oracle can be replaced by a the list of its Q random answers 1 ; ::: Q . Then, because of the randomness of the random oracle, the probability to produce a valid signature (t; c; y) of m without asking (m; t) is less than 1=k. Since " > 8Q=k > 2=k, A(!) asks the query (m; t) and forges a signature with probability "=2. Consequently, with probability 1=Q, M guesses an index such that the attacker succeds with Q = (m; t) with probability "=2Q. Using lemma 1 with X = f0; 1g ( 0:::k ) ?1 and Y = ( 0:::k ) Q? +1 , we distinguish the subset of tuples (!; 1 ; ::: ?1 ) such that the probability of success only taken over ( ; ::: R ) is "=4Q. M chooses ! and ( 1 ; ::: ?1 ) that belong to with probability "=4Q. Then, with probability "=4Q the last answers of the rst oracle leads A(!) to output a valid signature.
The probability of success with the two other random oracles is ("=4Q) 2 .
Furthermore gcd( ? 0 ; ? 00 ) = 0 iif = 0 = 00 so the probability to have gcd( ? 0 ; ? 00 ) = 0 is 1=k 2 and it is smaller than 1=4 ("=4Q) 2 . Lemma 8 proves that the probability to have gcd( ? 0 ; ? 00 ) > B is less than 2:7=B so, with B = 173 Q 2 =" 2 , this probability is also smaller than 1=4 ("=4Q) 2 . In conclusion, M succeeds with probability 1=Q "=4Q "=4Q 1=4("=4Q) 2 and (c; c 0 ; c 00 ) = ( ; 0 ; 00 ) are such that 0 < gcd(c ? c 0 ; c ? c 00 ) 173 Q 2 =" 2 . u t Theorem 10. Assume that kST=X and 1=k are negligible. If an existential forgery of the signature scheme under adaptatively chosen message attack has a non-negligible probability of success then the discrete logarithm can be computed in time polynomial in jnj. Proof. First, the signature oracle can be replaced by the Pptm(jnj) S(! 0 ) of lemma 7 which simulates valid signatures if kST=X is negligible. This modi es only negligibly the probability of succes of the attacker because overwise it would be able to distinguish between actual and simulated signatures and this would contradict lemma 7. Then, we can assume that A(!) does not ask the oracle a query whose answer is already known, i.e. already asked by A(!) or generated by the simulator. On the other hand S(! 0 ) can simulate twice the answer to the same query or one already asked by A(!). The probability to have such a \collision" is the probability to have (m i ; t i ) = Q j or (m i ; t i ) = (m j ; t j ). But if x is xed in 0; X and x 0 randomly chosen in the same set, the probability to have g x = g x 0 mod n is dX= (n)e=X < 1= (n) + 1=X. So the probability of collision is less than (RQ + R(R ?1)) (1= (n) + 1=X). We can further assume that 1= (n) and 1=X are negligible because overwise it would be possible to nd the secret key by an exhaustive search (eventually using a known signature) in polynomial time. Consequently the probability is negligible since Q and R are polynomials in jnj and for large enough values of the security parameter it becomes less than "=2.
If no query is asked twice, the random oracle can be considered as an oracle who just answers random values chosen in 0; k . With probability "=2, the attacker succeds in forging a signature in this context. Furthermore, 1=k is assumed to be negligible so, for large enough values jnj, "=2 > 8Q=k. We can now use exactly the same proof as for the previous theorem to prove that we can make a Pptm(jnj) able to compute discrete logarithms modulo n with nonnegligible probability.
u t
Applications

Choice of the Parameters
Let us rst focus on n. In the theoretical analysis, we have not restricted the possible values and we have reduced the security to the di culty of computing discrete logarithms modulo n. Notice that, if we know the factorization Q i p ei i of n, the Chinese remainder technique enables to reduce this problem to computing discrete logarithms modulo each factor p ei i . So, in order to prevent n from being factored, we must choose jnj greater than 512 bits and jnj = 1024 should be more appropriate for secure applications (see 3]). Moreover, the prime factors of n must have approximately the same size and must not be too numerous. In conclusion, n may be a prime integer, like p in the Schnorr scheme, or the product of a few distinct prime numbers in order to use identity-based public-keys (4.2).
The size of S is conditioned by the complexity of discrete logarithms algorithms such as the Pollard lambda method which enables to compute s in O( p S) operations. Furthermore, van Oorschot and Wiener have shown that this method can still be improved; we refer the reader to 21] for a precise analysis. We just notice that we should take jSj greater than 140 bits and preferably jSj 180.
The choice of the size of k is related to the probability of success of an adversary. The expected security depends on the application and jkj = 20 (`= 1) would probably be large enough for many identi cation systems. A larger value such as jkj = 80 would of course be preferred for signature schemes.
When the parameters S and k are chosen, since X=kS must be large enough to guarantee the statistical zero-knowledge property and to the security of the signature; we can for example take jXj jSj + jkj + 60 for identi cation and jXj jSj + jkj + 80 for signature schemes.
Identity Based Public Keys
Following ideas of Maurer and Yacobi 13], the public keys can be turned into identity-based keys. Assume that an authority knows the factorization of the publicly-known modulus n and that it is able to compute discrete logarithms modulo each prime factor and consequently modulo n. Then, the authority computes secret keys associated with public keys closely related to the identity of users. Note that since Z n is not cyclic, we have to add a small o set to the identity in order to obtain public keys which discrete logarithm exists.
We now recall a realistic scenario developped the discrete logarithm of a coding of each identity merged with a small o set to guarantee the existence of the logarithm. The subexponential-time indexcalculus algorithm 12] is the most powerful known method to solve this problem. During an initial processing stage it computes once and once only a database that contains the discrete logarithms of a few elements and then any discrete logarithm computation reuses this database.
Optimization of the Data Size
In order to decrease the number of communication bits, Fiat and Shamir 5] have suggested not to send the all commitment in the rst step of the identi cation but only a hash value. This trick can of course be used with our scheme. Let h 0 be a hash function and jh 0 j be the size of its output. The modi cations are very simple: the commitment t is replaced in the protocol by t 0 = h 0 (t) and the veri cation equation becomes t 0 = h 0 (g y v c mod n).
Using the notion of r-collision-free hash functions, i.e. functions such that it is not possible to nd r pairwise distinct values with the same image, Girault and Stern 8] have analyzed precisely the consequences of such a modi cation on the security of identi cation schemes. We just recall the results of their study on the minimal value of jh 0 j: if we note m the maximal number of queries to h 0 (for example m = 2 64 ) in a reasonable time, then jh 0 j must be greater than 128 m and than (2m r =r!) 1=r?1 . Furthermore, k must be increased to k 0 = k (r ? 1) in order to keep the same level of security (1=k`). All the details can be found Furthermore, we have already observed that the commitments can be computed o -line, by the individual device or by an authority. In fact, we just have to compute and to keep in memory pairs of the form (x; h 0 (g x mod n)). This can still be improved if the random values x are generated by a pseudo-random generator. This leads just to memorize the seed of the generator and the commitments, i.e. about only 10 bytes per authentication ! Finally, the signature (t 0 ; c; y) of a message m that one can verify using the equations c = h(m; t 0 ) and t 0 = h 0 (g y v c mod n) can be reduced to (m; c; y) with the single veri cation equation c = h(m; h 0 (g y v c mod n)).
Smart Card Application
In order to show to what extent the computations are minimal and the transmissions very short, we now present two applications that we have implemented on low cost smart cards based on a 6805 chip. The size of the program is very short, about 300 bytes. We see in the following table that the running time of the computation is very short and actually most of the time needed for an authentication is taken by the communication protocol between the card and the computer. Notice that, for signature, we do not take into account the computation time of the hash function; this would probably be the bottleneck of many very fast applications. In conclusion, this demonstrates that the scheme under study is really suitable for very fast \on the y" applications. 
